Three principal and interrelated concerns of health care policymakers are (1) controlling health care costs,
improving access to health care services, and (3) promoting high quality care. Although physician spending is only one-fifth of total health expenditures, physician decisions significantly affect costs, access and quality because physicians direct over 70 percent of all health care spending. 1/ This paper analyzes the incentives in Medicare and Medicaid physician payment policies and discusses their influence on health care costs and access for the programs ' beneficiaries.
While the relationship between physician reimbursement and quality of care is important, measurement problems and paucity of reliable data render it beyond the scope of this paper. and rates encompassing the entire Nation for a large number of medical procedures is available for these programs.
------------------
Third, since Medicare reimbursement is designed to pay the "going rate" in the private market, Medicare fees are believed to generally represent private sector payment patterns.
Physician Reimbursement Methods
In 1977 physician expenditures of $32.2 billion accounted for 20 percent of total national health care spending.
Of this amount, 37 percent was paid by private insurance, 24 percent by public programs, and 39 percent directly by patients. While the economic index generally reduces the absolute increase in Medicare-allowed reimbursements by 1-1/2 to 2 percentage points a year, it does not affect actual physician charges.
Moreover, the economic index limit on fees may lead to an increase in the number of visits or a decrease in the quality of a visit.
Furthermore, the economic index is locking into place all the existing prevailing charge imbalances between high and low fee regions and among physicians of different specialties.
This occurs because as physicians' actual fees continue to increase at a faster rate than the economic index limit, over time an increasing number of claims will be paid at the Medicare prevailing charge.
In effect, the prevailing charge screens are becoming fee schedules that represent historic geographic and specialty reimbursement differences. 1968-1972, 1972-1975, and 1968-1975 While hospitalized patients may be sicker and require more intensive physician care (e.g., on average, hospital visits are approximately 20 percent longer than office visits 17/), the physician himself bears none of the overhead expenses (e.g., rent, labor cost, equipment, drugs, etc.) associated with treating the patient in the office when treating a patient in the hospital, although he must bear time and transportation costs in going to the hospital. Since practice expenses compromise about 40 percent of a physician's gross revenues, the net value of the office visit reimbursement rate, after deducting office expenses, is even less compared with the hospital visit fee.
For example, not considering physician time and transportation costs to the hospital, the after expense value of the Medicare specialist follow-up office visit fee is $5.90 (60 percent Implicit in the discussion was the basic economic assumption that prices affect physician behavior. However, given the limited nature of the data (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) and the lack of behavioral relationships, the discussion has concentrated only on the empirically observed direction of the relationships. Given that the customary, prevailing and reasonable charge system was designed to reflect the private market and that it operates essentially as a physician-determined reimbursement system, these results are not surprising.
However, if national health insurance is to use the reimbursement system to promote cost containment and access to care as policy goals, then this analysis suggests that our predominantly laissez-faire reimbursement system will need to be modified. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
